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Under Title IX, sexual harassment can have
adverse effects on student-athletes and coaches alike.
I te Genuine incidents of abuse between a player and a
coach can destroy an athlete's self-esteem, ruin inter-
personal relationships, and damage further develop-
ment in school and sports. Groundless accusations against coaches can stain reputations, plague
careers, and intimidate prospective athletes. Neither coach nor athlete can hope to win when the
bounds of permissible behavior are so murky.
Sexual harassment is an innocuously tidy legal definition of human behavior that defies
delineation. Liability turns on perception and intent, context and response, impression and innu-
endo. These are factors to be weighed, not bright lines to be drawn. The ambiguities of inter-
personal conduct are only compounded on the playing field. In school athletics, contact is simply
part of the game. The intimate bonds between players and coaches are integral to the winning
team. The clear lines on the field-from base to base, from goal to goal-do not continue into the
law. It is little wonder, then, that players and coaches are often uncertain of their interaction in
an era of increased sensitivity and awareness. How to win the game but not lose the suit: that
is the demand of the school and the command of the law.
When these twin challenges conflict, who is responsible-
the academic institutions or the courts?
IN THE COURT ...
The Supreme Court created the applicable standard of
liability in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, holding that:
academic institutions are not liable for
teacher-student sexual harassment under
Title IX unless an employee who has been
invested by the school board with supervisory
power over the offending employee actually
knew of the abuse, had the power to end the
abuse, and failed to do so. 1
The Gebser standard brought an immediate halt to the
reconstruction of sexual harassment in the academic set-
ting. This Note contends that the Court was insensitive
to the adverse effect on student-athletes in creating the
standard. In order to avoid liability under this standard,
academic institutions now have reason to purposefully
avert their attention from occurrences of sexual harass-
ment. It's a case of "see no evil, hear no evil," and it will
defeat liability every time. Academic institutions that
dodge actual knowledge seemingly contribute to the out-
break of sexual harassment by not addressing it square-
ly. This response is not surprising. Schools are doing
what everyone else is doing-protecting themselves from
an uncertain legal liability.
... ON THE FIELD
In clear cases of sexual harassment, it is easy and
appropriate to punish improper, predatory behavior. In
such cases, the victim will be compelled to report the
abuse, and the school will be compelled to respond. But
the athletic environment occupies the blurry periphery of
conduct that violates personhood. Here, in the sports
context, intimate contact is routine, whether in heated
moments on the field or in the forced companionship on
the road. There is an increased risk of sexual harass-
ment because the very environment is characterized by
close physical and emotional relationships as well as
unequal power relations. Physical acts often define sex-
ual harassment, but it is not unusual to see a coach slap
one of his or her athletes on the rear. The legal definition
may or may not reach such conduct, and that uncertain-
ty is a problem. But the academic institutions would not
even reach this concern-they would never investigate in
the first place. This complacency is cause for alarm, com-
placency that results from a law that has failed athletes
and coaches alike. The standard articulated by Gebser is
the real culprit behind the legal instability of sexual
harassment. This must be changed to compel academic
institutions to take a more active role in the prevention
of sexual harassment.
In order to isolate the problem of protecting student-
athletes, this Note focuses on coach-athlete sexual harass-
ment only in the college setting. The complexity of ath-
letes as minors raises further issues outside the scope of
this Note and will not be addressed. Here, the discussion
will provide an overview of Title IX history, explaining
how the judiciary has played an active role in interpreting
Title IX and applying it to academic institutions. Then the
focus shifts to sexual harassment between a coach and an
athlete, comparing the two kinds of sexual harassment
and tracing the development of cases to the present stan-
dard. Next, the Note will examine the current standard
of liability, inquiring whether it fulfills the purpose of
Title IX and how academic institutions have abused it to
sidestep responsibility. Finally, it will demonstrate how
the requirement of "actual knowledge" creates institu-
tional inertia. In sum, the Note demonstrates how the
"know or should have known" standard is the best option
for purposes of policy and effectiveness of law.
JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF TITLE IX
In 1972, Congress enacted Title IX of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to attack gender discrimination in education-
al programs and activities that received federal funding.
2
Title IX was passed for two primary purposes. First,
Congress sought to curtail the disbursement of funds to
educational institutions that tolerated sexual discrimina-
tion.3 Second, Congress sought to provide individuals
with a legal recourse against such abuse. 4
Title IX mirrors § 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on race,
color, or national origin in any program or activity receiv-
ing federal funds, including educational institutions. 5
The language of Title IX is similar to Title VI, except
Title IX substituted the word "sex" for the words "race,
color, or national origin."'6 Title IX broadened the cover-
age of Title VI by stating that "no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partic-
ipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance."
7
Title IX limits its protection against gender discrimi-
nation to any "educational program or activity receiving
federal financial assistance."8 Initially, the courts were
divided as to the proper interpretation of this provision.
Some courts concluded that the text mandated a pro-
gram-specific approach by which Title IX applied only to
programs that received direct federal funding.9 Other
courts held that Title IX required an "institution-wide
approach," extending Title IX to every program within an
academic institution if any program therein were sup-
ported by federal funds. 10 Since most athletic depart-
ments do not receive direct federal assistance, however,
universities countered that Title IX did not apply to their
athletic programs.
In 1982, the Supreme Court held in North Haven
Board of Education v. Bell that Title IX applied only to
specific programs receiving federal aid.11 The court then
affirmed this interpretation in 1984 in Grove City
College v. Bell. In that case, the court held that Title IX
did not apply to programs within colleges, such as ath-
letics, which did not receive direct federal funds.
12 The
Grove City decision effectively removed nearly every col-
legiate athletic program from Title IX's reach because
few received direct federal funding. Four years later,
however, Congress vacated Grove with the passage of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (the "1988
Amendments"). 13 The 1988 Amendments validated the
institution-wide approach, bringing all programs within
a federally funded institution under the veil of Title IX.
TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Courts have developed two legal constructs to define
sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo and (2) hostile envi-
ronment. These theories originated in employment cases
but have since been extended to the educational setting.
Quid Pro Quo
The doctrinal foundation for quid pro quo harassment
was established in Williams v. Saxbe. 14 Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when a coach makes tangible
benefits-such as a scholarship, recommendation, play-
ing time, or position on the team-contingent on the vic-
tim providing sexual favors. 15 Once the threat or offer is
made, sexual harassment has occurred whether or not
the victim complies. 16 There is normally strict liability
for quid pro quo sexual harassment.
1 7
Hostile Environment
Bundv v. Jackson was the first case to recognize hos-
tile environment harassment. 18 This type of harassment
occurs when the victim's surroundings are permeated
with discriminatory ridicule, intimidation, and insult
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive envi-
ronment. 19 Hostile environment harassment, unlike
quid pro quo, does not result from direct propositioning
but nonetheless can adversely affect the psychological
and emotional state of the victim.20 In the academic and
athletic setting, this can cause great harm to the future
development of an athlete. As one federal court explained,
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tial to maximum growth and is therefore an
integral part of the educational benefits that a
student receives. A sexually abusive environ-
ment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed
student from developing her full potential and
receiving the most from the academic program."
2 1
EVOLUTION OF COACH-ATHLETE SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CASE LAW
Most cases brought under Title IX initially involved
gender discrimination issues, challenging unequal ath-
letic opportunities for women. In recent years, however,
the scope of Title IX has expanded to include sexual gen-
der discrimination as well. A survey of 1,600 students
revealed that approximately 80 percent had experienced
some form of sexual harassment at school. 2 2 Three cases
in particular have been instrumental in shaping the law
that controls sexual harassment in the school context.
Alexander v. Yale University
The first case to consider a student's claim for sexual
harassment against a teacher was Alexander v. Yale
University.2 3 Here, five women sought an order requir-
ing Yale to institute a grievance procedure for victims of
sexual harassment.2 4 They alleged that the absence of
such safeguards denied them an equal opportunity in
education in violation of Title IX.25
All five women alleged some form of sexual harass-
ment. One of the plaintiffs, Pamela Price, claimed that
she had been offered an "A" by one of her professors in
exchange for sexual favors. 26 When she declined his
offer, she received a "C," a grade that she claimed did not
reflect a fair evaluation of
her academic work. 27 She
reported the incident to
Yale officials who did not (
investigate. 2 8  Margery
Reifler, the field hockey team
manager, related a similar
story. She alleged that she
was sexually harassed by the
coach and she suffered
extreme "distress and humil- r
iation. '2 9  Reifler testified
that she did not alert school
officials of the incident
because Yale lacked a legiti- "
mate grievance procedure. 30
Another plaintiff in the 1 "II ,
case, Lisa Stone, also
claimed emotional distress. Her anxiety resulted from
her discussion with another young woman, who had
been a victim of sexual harassment at Yale
University. 3 1 Stone claimed she feared being victim-
ized and left without a viable remedy, and that this
anguish interfered substantially with her education.3 2
The fourth plaintiff, Ann Olivarius, alleged that she
was forced to spend her own time, effort, and money
investigating the incidents of sexual harassment
because Yale officials refused to do so. 33  She also
claimed her efforts made her the object of threats and
intimidation from individuals involved in her investiga-
tions.3 4 The final plaintiff, Ronni Alexander, alleged
that she was forced to give up her study of the flute due
to repeated sexual advances by her music instructor. 3 5
Once again, Yale officials were found to have made no
attempt to address the situation.
A federal district court in Connecticut dismissed all
but one of the plaintiffs' claims. 36 The court stated that
the plaintiffs had failed to "advance a claim that they had
been deprived of cognizable Title IX rights. '3 7 The dis-
trict court also found the issue to be moot because the
students had since graduated. 38 The court allowed only
Pamela Price to argue her claim because it alone pre-
sented a legitimate case of potential sexual harass-
ment. 39 At trial, however, the court found that the
alleged sexual harassment never happened and that
Price's grade indeed reflected her work. 40 All five of the
women appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed. 4 1 The court agreed that, with the exception of
Price, the other plaintiffs had failed to establish a "dis-
tinct and palpable injury" that could be redressed.
4 2
According to the court, their claims lacked justiciabili-
ty.4 3 In a Title IX suit, the
S , court ruled, only the depri-
vation of "educational" ben-
efits warranted relief.
4 4
Since the alleged depriva-
tions at issue-field hockey
and flute lessons-"relate
to an activity removed from
the ordinary educational
process, a more detailed
'  allegation of injuries suf-
fered, as a result of the dep-
y }, rivation, is required. '4 5 The
plaintiffs, however, failed to
xS cI 1 smeet this requirement.
As an initial step in the
I S. development of doctrine,
Alexander was the first case
to recognize that sexual harassment of students is pro-
hibited by Title IX.46 In the context of athletics, it would
serve to impose liability when a coach sexually harasses
athletes.
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools
Franklin was the first Title IX sex-based harassment
case to reach the Supreme Court. 4 7 The case began when
Andrew Hill, a sports coach and high school teacher,
started to confront Christine Franklin with sexual
advances at the beginning of her sophomore year.48 Hill
would often stop Franklin to inquire about her sexual
experiences with her boyfriend and attempt to engage
her in sexually explicit conversations. 4 9  Franklin
claimed that Hill had asked her whether she would con-
sider having sexual intercourse with an older man, had
forcibly kissed her, and had telephoned her at home to
ask her out on a date. 50 Allegedly, on three occasions, he
arranged for her dismissal from classes for the purpose of
forcible intercourse in a private office. 51
Franklin further alleged that she went to other teach-
ers and school administrators for help. 52 School officials,
however, took no action to curb Hill's behavior, which
discouraged Franklin from pressing charges.5 3 At the
conclusion of the school district's investigation, Franklin
filed a complaint with the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in
the Department of Education. 54 After an independent
inquiry, the OCR ruled that the school district had vio-
lated Franklin's right to be free from physical and verbal
harassment and her right to protest conduct proscribed
by Title IX. 55 The OCR, however, decided not to act. In
the interim, Hill had resigned and the school had imple-
mented a formal grievance procedure.
56
Disgruntled with this result, Franklin then filed a
Title IX suit, seeking damages against the Gwinnett
County School District. The federal district court dis-
missed on the ground that Title IX did not authorize an
award of monetary damages. 5 7 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed, adding that although a private right of
action existed under Title IX, an action for monetary
damages could not be sustained for an intentional viola-
tion of Title IX.58 The court noted that because Title IX
had been enacted under spending clause legislation, it
could not allow for the recovery of monetary damages
absent express instruction from Congress or clear direc-
tion from the Supreme Court.
59
The United States Supreme Court reversed, giving
such clear direction. 60  The court held that, unless
Congress expressly specified otherwise, monetary dam-
ages would be available to a Title IX plaintiff.6 1  The
court noted that federal courts are authorized by statute
to use any remedy available to protect legal rights. 62 The
court also observed that Congress had not intended to
limit remedies available in a Title IX suit.
6 3
According to the court, Gwinnett County had a duty
under Title IX not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate
because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor dis-
criminates on the basis of sex."6 4  The court concluded
that the same rule applied when a teacher or coach sex-
ually abused and harassed the student.
65
Under Franklin, institutions that practice intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender may be obligated to
pay the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages, in
addition to restructuring its program in compliance with
Title IX.66 This decision alerted all athletic directors and
college administrators that they now must take prompt
action to correct and prevent any sexually harassing
behavior between a coach and an athlete. If a school
ignores improper and abusive relationships between ath-
letes and coaches, vicarious liability could attach.
Franklin also encouraged athletes to bring their actions for-
ward in order to claim relief.67 Moreover, the decision for-
mulated the standard that best serves the policy of prevent-
ing harassment in the first place: constructive knowledge.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent
School District
In the recent Gebser case, Alida Star Gebser, an
eighth-grade student, met Frank Waldrop at a book dis-
cussion group. 68 As leader of the group and teacher at
Lago Vista High School, Waldrop often made sexually
suggestive comments to the students during the book dis-
cussion sessions. 6 9 Later in the year, Waldrop began to
direct his sexual comments to Gebser in particular, espe-
cially when they were alone together. 70 He visited her
at home to give her a book, and while there he kissed and
fondled her.7 1 The two then began a year-long relation-
ship that included frequent sexual intercourse.
7 2
During that time, Gebser never attempted to report
Waldrop's conduct to any school officials. 7 3 Nor did the
Lago Vista school district have an official grievance pro-
cedure with which she could lodge a complaint.
7 4
In October 1992, after the parents of two other stu-
dents complained, the principal admonished Waldrop for
his sexual innuendoes in the classroom. 75 At the start of
the spring semester a few months later, a police officer
caught Waldrop and Gebser engaged in sex and arrested
the teacher.7 6 The school district immediately terminat-
ed him. Gebser and her mother then commenced an
action against the school district claiming, inter alia, vio-
lations of Title IX and state negligence law.
7 7
The federal district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the school district on all claims. 78  Gebser
appealed solely on the Title IX claim. 7 9 On appeal, it was
affirmed that strict liability would not be imposed on a
school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a stu-
dent.8 0 The United States Supreme Court agreed, con-
cluding that Lago Vista could not be liable on the basis of
constructive notice alone. The court added that there
was no evidence to suggest a school official knew about
Waldrop's relationship with Gebser.
8 1
In Gebser, the court noted that Franklin had merely
supported the proposition that sexual harassment was a
form of sex discrimination but did not adopt its guide for
liability standards.8 2 The court then explained how it
was clarifying the holding in Franklin. In reality, the
court was providing an entirely new rule:
[S]chool districts are not liable in tort for
teacher-student sexual harassment under
Title IX unless an employee who has been
invested by the school board with supervisory
power over the offending employee actually
knew of the abuse, had the power to end the
abuse, and failed to do so. 8 3
Gebser narrowed the protection placed around ath-
letes by Franklin, providing that schools were liable only
if a supervising employee with actual knowledge had
intentionally disregarded incidents of harassment.
RELIEF UNDER TITLE IX
Title IX requires educational institutions that receive
federal assistance to provide education free of sex dis-
crimination. Initially, the only remedy available for any
violation was the denial of federal funding to that insti-
tution. 84 Without other remedy, student-athletes who
were sexually harassed rarely pursued redress under
Title IX. Thus, many student-athlete sexual harassment
suits were brought under § 1983 or as violations of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution. In fact, Title IX did not expressly empow-
er any private action until Cannon v. University of
Chicago, in which the Supreme Court found an implied
right for individuals to pursue injunctions against violations
of Title IX.
85
At that time, a Title IX plaintiff received declaratory
or injunctive relief only if she won the case.8 6 The only
monetary relief available was the shifting of attorney's
fees as provided under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976.87 Otherwise, Congress offered no
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dies. 88 As a result, the Supreme Court judicially creat-
ed recovery of damages for private actions in 1992 in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.8 9 However,
just because a remedy exists, does not mean rights are
easily vindicated. The path to proof is arduous. As the
Supreme Court cautioned,
"a damages remedy will not lie under Title IX
unless an official who at a minimum has
authority to address the alleged discrimina-
tion and to institute corrective measures on
the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of
discrimination in the recipient's programs and
fails adequately to respond."90
IS "ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE" ACTUALLY RIGHT?
Although Title IX is patterned after Title VII, there
are obvious differences between the sports environment
and an employment setting. These differences suggest
that Title IX should provide greater, or at least equal,
protection against sexual harassment as extended by
Title VII. A more protective standard for Title IX is war-
ranted due to the athletes' inherent trust in and depend-
ence upon their coach, as well as the differences in age
and level of maturity. In contrast, such vulnerability is
not implicated in the employer-employee relationship.
In spite of these compelling differences, the Supreme
Court has actually come to the entirely opposite result.
It has lowered the standard in Title VII cases by holding
that employers are now vicariously liable for the sexual
misconduct of their employees, even if management was
unaware of the situation. 9 1 Yet, at the same time, the
Court increased the standard in the educational setting
by ruling that universities are vicariously liable only if a
high-level official knew about the sexual harassment and
deliberately did nothing to stop it.9
2
The "actual knowledge" standard discourages schools
from effectively addressing sexual harassment concerns
because doing so would indicate some level of knowledge. It
further furnishes schools with valid defenses against liabil-
ity, offering little incentive to affirmatively protect athletes.
First, vicarious liability is imposed only if a high-level
official was aware of the incident. But who exactly is con-
sidered a "high level official" in the sports arena? An ath-
letic director? An assistant coach? Ironically, it is only
clear that teachers-the persons most likely to be aware
of harassment due to daily interactions with students-
are apparently not considered high-level officials. 9
3
Therefore, even though a coach or teacher may be aware
and capable of stopping the sexual harassment, an aca-
demic institution is shielded from liability because the
athletic director or the dean of the school was not prop-
erly informed.
Second, once a high-level official receives word of the
harassment, any failure to intervene must be intentional
to violate Title IX. Thus, the school can ward off liabili-
ty by arguing that its inaction was not deliberate. In
other words, a good faith effort on the part of the educa-
tional institution to end harassment will avoid liability,
even if hindsight demonstrates that the institution's
response was superficial or ineffectual. But it should be
irrelevant whether a failure to terminate the abuse was
intentional or negligent. Moreover, the manner of com-
munication-whether via teacher or high-level official-
should be irrelevant. Liability should be imposed regard-
less. Focusing on the mental state or intent of the school
official distracts from the real inquiry: the mental state
of the victim and the intent of the accused aggressor.
As it now exists, this standard rewards the neglect of
academic institutions. They have no reason to actively
educate, monitor, seek out, and eliminate incidents of
sexual harassment. Coaches are adversely affected when
academic institutions fail to prepare athletes with an
adequate understanding of sexual harassment. Athletes,
unsure of what constitutes sexual harassment, may con-
strue an act that is perhaps appropriate in the context of
sports as sexual harassment. Even the scant protection
of the standard is further limited by requiring the victim
to take the initiative and report sexual harassment to a
high-level official. A survey of college students reported
that victims of sexual harassment tend to avoid seeking
assistance from professors and the administration and,
in fact, avoid all further school-sponsored social situa-
tions.9 4 Thus, a standard must be designed to motivate
actors other than the athlete to monitor and report
instances of sexual harassment.
FINDING A NEW STANDARD
Title IX has the power to address this problem in two
ways: by protecting students from discriminatory behav-
ior and by providing relief for teacher/coach misconduct
when the school fails to oversee its staff. In order to
achieve these goals, Title IX must have a meaningful
standard of institutional liability. In addition to the
present standard of actual knowledge, three other meas-
ures-agency, strict liability, and constructive knowl-
edge--have been applied to Title IX cases. Courts must
create a new standard which will integrate the right com-
bination of fairness, knowledge, strictness, and culpability.
Agency Doctrine
Courts have applied agency principles in their attempt
to find a viable solution. 9 5 These principles can easily be
adapted to the relationship between a coach and an aca-
demic institution. To establish an agency relationship,
the plaintiff must show a degree of control over the agent
(coach) by the principal (university), which can be
marked by the ability to fire the agent. The relationship
between a coach and a university is a clear example of
this arrangement. The school grants the coach authority
to act for the school in training the athletes. 96 When a
coach uses this authority to sexually harass one of his
athletes, the school is vicariously liable and may be
required to respond in damages.9 7
Liability attaches to an academic institution only if
the coach is acting within the scope of employment. If
the harassment occurred on school grounds or while the
coach was acting in his role as an employee of the school,
the argument for vicarious liability is strong. Yet at least
one court has argued that "no teacher who sexually abus-
es a student acts in the scope of his authority. ' 9 8 Thus,
an athlete's access to relief may be hindered if the act of
harassment is wholly unrelated to the employment rela-
tionship, thus removing the case from agency doctrine.
Advocates of this standard argue that student-athletes
should receive at least the same protection as employees
under Title VII. However, inherent differences exist in
the degree of control that universities and other employ-
ers exercise. 9 9 Coaching entails discretion due to its spe-
cialized nature and the departmentalized athletic struc-
ture of most universities; the deference it accords is not
present in most other employer-employee relationships.
Thus, agency principles are not easily applicable.
Moreover, if Congress had desired the standard to be con-
ditioned upon that doctrine, it would have indicated this
in legislative history.100
Strict Liability
The strict liability standard holds that academic insti-
tutions are liable for sexual harassment, knowledge
notwithstanding. Thus, a standard of strict liability will
easily serve one of the two purposes of Title IX-to pro-
vide relief to a harassed student. Strict liability is
applied in some Title IX cases involving quid pro quo
harassment. The standard has two important advan-
tages. First, this standard places the "risk of harm on
the party who is in a better position to deal with the
overall problem," i.e., the academic institution. 10 1 This
would force universities to carefully monitor and strictly
control relations between athletes and coaches. Thus the
preventive effect of strict liability standard arguably out-
weighs the unfairness of exposing academic institutions
to liability even when it has adopted policy procedures.
Second, this standard "heightens the vigilance" of all actors
and ensures that coaches take the problem seriously.102
While a strict liability standard might spur some uni-
versities to action, there is an equal possibility that it
will cause others to shrug, sit back, and do nothing.
Some administrations may reason that if a coach wants
to sexually harass one of his athletes, he will do so
despite the best seminars, warnings, or other preventive
procedures. Thus, no preventive measure could defeat
liability. Also, there is a danger that athletes may abuse
the process. Athletes may seduce coaches to generate a
sexual harassment claim, hoping to create an easy path
to monetary relief under Title IX or pressure the school
for a quick settlement. Thus, the unavoidable liability
and financial risk to a university is too high under a
strict liability regime.
Constructive Knowledge
Before Gebser, the majority of courts applied Title
VII's constructive knowledge liability standard in Title
IX cases. Vicarious liability was imposed whenever an
educational institution knew or should have known of sex
discrimination but failed to take appropriate action rea-
sonably calculated to end it.
The constructive, "know or should have known" stan-
dard, best achieves the purpose of the law. It motivates
academic institutions to take a more active role in seek-
ing out instances of sexual harassment. It encourages
schools to educate athletes about what constitutes sexu-
al harassment and prompts them to deal with actual inci-
dents more quickly and effectively.
Admittedly, there are many arguments against a con-
structive knowledge standard. First, the Supreme Court
has ruled that it would conflict with Title IX's goals as
well as contravene the Spending Clause, the constitu-
tional authority for Title IX.1 0 3 Legislation authorized
by the Spending Clause offers a "contractual framework"
to potential recipients of federal funding.104 Recipients
must have actual notice of the conditions they are
assuming when they accept such funding. 10 5 Thus, the
argument goes, Title VII's "knew or should have known"
constructive notice standard is essentially a negligence
standard which should not be imputed to cases arising
under Title IX. To remedy this, however, the construc-
tive knowledge standard should be included as an
express condition of the federal funding, providing recip-
ients with notice of their potential liability if funded
under Title IX.
Other critics argue that the "knew or should have
known" standard is simply ineffective in coach-athlete
sexual harassment. According to one court, sexual mis-
conduct by a coach "will almost always occur in secre-
cy." 10 6 This secrecy will limit investigation procedures
because an academic institution will not want to be in a
position where it "should have known" of the abuse. 10 7
However, the increased liability encompasses more than
its critics would admit. And that is its strength. Schools
will, in fact, wonder when a court might rule that it
"should have known" about the sexual harassment. This
insecurity will motivate schools to balance the cost of lit-
igation against the cost of investigating and implement-
ing programs. Because the financial liability and public-
ity are too disruptive, the scales will tip in favor of pre-
vention and investigation. Thus the constructive knowl-
edge mandates heightened vigilance. Yet it is not as
over-reaching or unfair as strict liability-it will not hold
schools liable for secret, unspoken abuse.
The constructive knowledge standard is similar to the
"actual knowledge" standard, and thus has some of the
same potential problems. The constructive knowledge
standard is ultimately stronger, though. First, it elimi-
nates the "high-level official' limitation by allowing
notice, either actual or constructive, to be provided to the
school by anyone-including a teacher. 10 8  Second, the
"should have known" eliminates the requirement of
intentional disregard, which is unworkable and frus-
trates the very purpose of Title IX. The constructive
knowledge standard stands as a median between two
extremes-the actual knowledge and strict liability stan-
dard-and would lead to more responsive schools and
more effective investigations.
THE LAW MUST PREVENT TO PROTECT
As a social problem, sexual harassment is tragic and
destructive whenever and however it occurs. And now
the footprints of sexual harassment lead to the athletic
field. Athletes need greater protection due to their
increased vulnerability and dependence. Numerous ath-
letes are coming forth with shocking stories about what
really goes on behind the scenes in the locker room. Some
charges are valid, some are not. However, enough set-
tlements have been paid, and enough coaches have qui-
etly resigned, to suggest that there still is a problem.
As a legal problem, Title IX litigation is not disap-
pearing. It is expanding into other areas-peer sexual
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